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From the Sublime to the Political: 
Some Historical Notes 
Gary Shapiro 
T HE BEAUTIFUL and the sublime? Rilke, at the beginning of an 
exemplary modernist poem, suggests that the contrast may 
be superficial: 
Denn das Schone ist nichts 
als des Schrecklichen Anfang, den wir noch grade ertragen 
und wir bewundern es so, weil es gelassen verschmaht, 
uns zu zerstoren. Ein jeder Engel ist schrecklich. 
[Because beauty's nothing 
but the start of terror we can hardly bear, 
and we adore it because of the serene scorn 
it could kill us with. Every angel's terrifying.]1 
These lines suggest that the idea of the beautiful as a self-sufficient 
aesthetic experience in which we achieve a synthesis of motion and 
rest, desire and contemplation, is an illusion. The illusion is destined 
to give way to a more genuine experience of terror when we confront 
the pure and cold poetic consciousness which is represented by Rilke's 
angels. As such it is typical of a strain of modernist poetics and aes- 
thetics which exalts the sublime at the expense of the beautiful. 
Let me document my suggestion that modernist poetics tends to 
give a privileged position to what has traditionally been known as the 
sublime by adducing two examples from rather disparate traditions. 
Martin Heidegger's ontological poetics can reasonably be viewed as a 
renewal of the aesthetics of the sublime-although Heidegger never 
uses the term sublime, so far as I know-and is explicitly hostile to 
the limitations of aesthetics, conceived as an autonomous study of a 
certain kind of experience. Harold Bloom does recur to the Romantic 
terminology of sublimity in his attempt to construct a poetics which 
will focus on the Freudian and Nietzchean themes of power and 
repression. Heidegger is interested in the Ur-sprung of the work of 
art, that is, the original leap or thrust by means of which it opens up 
a new sense of the world; this is experienced as shock or displacement 
and as a threat to what is so far established. Such displacement, com- 
bined with Heidegger's concern with death, which occupies a central 
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place in his hermeneutics, is sufficient to demonstrate the parallels 
between his poetics and the classical theory of the sublime. Heideg- 
ger's basic revision of the classical theory is his historicizing of it so 
that the sublime is not simply the monstrous, novel, or shocking but 
is construed as the appearance of such qualities in a new epoch which 
is sent to us by Being. In a commentary on some lines of Holderlin 
(". . . poetically man dwells .. ."), Heidegger discusses the problem of 
measure and the measureless, a theme which occurs in accounts of 
the sublime. In Holderlin's lines, says Heidegger, God is the measure 
for man and yet God is unknown. But how can that which is unknown 
serve as a measure? Poet and thinker seem to agree that God is known 
by appearing "as the one who remains unknown," just as Kant de- 
scribes the search for measure inspired by the mathematically infinite 
as leading to an awareness of the moral self, whose law of duty pro- 
vokes a sense of awe (Achtung) but which is mysteriously unknowable 
to each of us, despite it being our own deepest nature. Holderlin had 
suggested that God was "manifest like the sky." Here one thinks of 
Kant's "starry skies above and the moral law within." The measure, 
Heidegger continues, "consists in the way in which the god who re- 
mains unknown, is revealed as such by the sky. God's appearance 
through the sky consists in a disclosing that lets us see what conceals 
itself, but lets us see it not by seeking to wrest what is concealed out 
of its concealedness but only by guarding the concealed in its self- 
concealment. Thus the unknown god appears as the unknown by 
way of the sky's manifestness."2 
It is worth noting that, despite the formal similarities linking the 
Kantian and Heideggerian versions of the sublime, the latter has a 
more pronounced sense of the wholly other. At the end of the Kan- 
tian movement of the sublime is the moral self which is at least our 
own foundation, even if it is not transparent to us. In Holderlin's 
poem and in the later Heidegger the ground of the sublime is God 
or Being, conceived not on the lines of Spinoza's rational deus sive 
natura, but as the unknowable source of our historical destiny. 
Another variation on the sublime, this time beginning from a psy- 
chologically oriented hermeneutic, is the work of Harold Bloom. 
Bloom sees the sublime not as a category of ontology, but of the poet's 
experience and work. Each aspiring poet experiences a virtual threat 
to his own existence (a real threat to his life as a poet) in the work of 
a great precursor. Like the mathematical and dynamical sublime of 
Kantian theory, the work of the earlier "strong" poet seems infinite 
and unsurpassable, offering the newcomer the opportunity of be- 
coming a mere imitator. In response to this threat, a few aspirants 
find their poetic vocations through the experience of what Bloom 
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calls the Counter-Sublime: that is, they assert a new and more pow- 
erful poetic vision which includes and comprehends the poetry of 
their strong precursor. Bloom's Counter-Sublime corresponds to 
what Kant calls the sublime itself, since for Kant the initial threat is 
not sublime, but it is the occasion of the sublime. Bloom, however, 
offers a psychological account of the objectification (or reification) of 
the sublime as daemonization. The poet becomes daemonic to the 
extent that he wrestles with his great precursor. Such an access of 
energy and the sense of mastery tend to spill over into the thematic 
concerns of his poetry, so that there is "an intrusion of the numinous" 
and of "the idea of the Holy."3 
The sense that Bloom is providing a psychoanalytic version of the 
ontology of the Heideggerian sublime is intensified by his citation of 
Rilke and the applicability of his account to Holderlin. In Rilke "the 
revisionary ratio of daemonization was stronger than in any other poet 
of our century";4 like Shelley, he "compels us to see him in the com- 
pany of angels, the daemonic partners of his quest for totality."5 This 
suggests a more precise reading of the lines from the Duino Elegies 
cited earlier. "Beauty's nothing / but the start of terror we can hardly 
bear" becomes intelligible, on Bloom's reading, when it is realized 
that Rilke's "we" is that of the poets rather than of a generalized 
human group. Sometimes he has surreptitiously used the "we" to des- 
ignate the singular "I" of his own poetic voice. The "I" is ostensibly 
doubtful of his own powers: "And if I cried, who'd listen to me in 
those angelic / orders?" Crying out in one's own voice would be 
making poetry by oneself. The Elegies then turn out to be elegies for 
the poetic power or temptation rather than for some more general- 
ized conception of human life. The poet alternately fears and laments 
the loss of poetic power: 
And we: spectators, always, everywhere, 
looking at everything and neverfrom! 
It floods us. We arrange it. It decays. 
We arrange it again and we decay. 
("Eighth Elegy") 
The poetics of Heidegger and Bloom make little explicit reference 
to the political as such. The existential thinker has ontologized the 
sublime, and the American critic has translated it into essentially psy- 
chological categories which derive from Nietzsche and Freud. Nev- 
ertheless, there are clearly political dimensions in each of these po- 
etics of the sublime. This emerges in Heidegger in the analysis of 
poetry and history. The original act of institution or establishment, 
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the Ur-sprung by which a novel work of art opens up a world, is said 
to be of the same general type by which a state or a people acquires 
a historical identity: "Whenever art happens-that is, whenever there 
is a beginning-a thrust enters history, history either begins or starts 
over again. History means here not a sequence in time of events of 
whatever sort, however important. History is the transporting of a 
people into its appointed task as entrance into that people's endow- 
ment."6 Heidegger's notorious connection with the Nazis shows that 
an exclusive poetics of the sublime can lend itself all too easily to 
irrationalist, fascist politics. Despite Heidegger's eventual repudiation 
of the Nazis, however, even his later thinking represents another 
dangerous turn of his historical poetics. Heidegger has nothing to 
say about poetry in any language after the time of Stefan George, 
Rilke, and Trakl. This silence seems to derive from his historical 
analysis of the present as the age of technology. As early as 1936 
Heidegger had described the truth of the Nazi movement as its re- 
sistance to the impersonal technological world represented by both 
the United States and the Soviet Union. By the 1950s he came to 
believe that the entire world was under the domination of technology, 
and that literary criticism, among other disciplines, had, with its phil- 
ological methods and scientific pretensions, come to be a part of a 
global technological complex. Presumably he thought that authentic 
art was not possible within such a world. Yet Heidegger awaited a 
new sending (Geschick) of Being, which would, if it occurred, be an 
external deliverance. So just as an aesthetics of the historical sublime 
can authorize a commitment to a political movement promising a 
radical break with the past, so it can, in its ontological version, legi- 
timize a quietism which patiently awaits a salvation which can come 
only from an impersonal destiny. (Here there is an instructive parallel 
in the work of Walter Benjamin, whose thought oscillated between a 
messianic, Cabbalistic pole in which a degraded world awaits divine 
salvation, and an activist Marxism which finds that salvation instan- 
tiated in the Soviet Union and the communism of the 1930s.) 
Bloom's psychological version of the sublime would seem at first to 
be devoid of political ramifications. In fact, like some other devel- 
opments of Nietzschean and Freudian themes, it is an individualistic 
withdrawal from the political sphere. Yet as with so many forms of 
methodological individualism, Bloom's model of individual activity is 
one which reflects prevailing social norms within a given culture. We 
can begin to analyze these introjected social norms by noting the 
historical limits that Bloom himself draws around his project. 
Working mainly with English and American poetry, he finds Shake- 
speare (and presumably all earlier poets) to be outside the range of 
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his analysis. The tradition which he is concerned with, then, is that 
from Ben Jonson and Milton to the present. The pattern of that 
tradition is one in which there is an unrelenting pressure on the 
aspiring poet to create his own poetic capital by overcoming the 
achievements of his precursors. Competition and individual success 
become the presiding values of poetry as they do in civil society. 
Nevertheless, there seem to be limits to poetic expansion and inno- 
vation, which lead eventually to diminishing returns and to increased 
anxiety as to whether one's new product is sufficiently new to arouse 
interest. In such a situation one major form of entrepreneurship 
which still remains open is that of criticism, where the possibilities 
have not been similarly depleted. Accordingly, Bloom's claim that 
criticism can embody the same values and exhibit the same dynamic 
as poetry can be viewed as the opening of a new economic frontier. 
Bloom's own work may exhibit an anxiety toward the influence of 
Northrop Frye, but his position within poetic criticism would still be 
more like that of the Romantics than like that of their contemporary 
poetic epigones. 
In contrast to such theories of the sublime, the beautiful also makes 
its appearance in modern poetics in the form of a criticism which 
emphasizes the coherence, autonomy, and organic unity of the poem. 
The American New Criticism was a consistent effort to read all poetry 
in terms of such criteria. The New Criticism has often been accused 
of taking a fundamentally conservative social stance insofar as it iden- 
tifies the qualities of the good society and the good poem; nostalgia 
for an organic past is then seen as the motive behind the valorization 
of the organic poem. Today there is a widely held impression that 
only criticism oriented toward the sublime is really interesting, re- 
gardless of its political tendency. One can then be led to a reluctant 
acceptance of the poetics of sublimity, despite reservations about the 
moral and political context of the critical theories which invoke this 
aesthetic mode. It seems to me that such views take an overly one- 
sided perspective on the resources of the aesthetic and poetic tradi- 
tion, especially of that tradition in German aesthetics which extends 
from Kant to Marx and to a number of schools of Marxist aesthetics. 
Let me turn, then, to a reconstruction of a somewhat neglected di- 
mension of that tradition. 
Kant's analysis of the beautiful and sublime is a summa and critique 
of the ideal of taste which was at the center of aesthetic thinking in 
the eighteenth century. The first part of the Critique ofJudgment, it is 
arguable, could stand on its own, apart from the analysis of teleology 
in nature which follows it. If so it could be called the "Critique of 
Taste." "Taste" sounds rather dated now, at the end of a century of 
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artistic experimentation which has apparently overthrown all the 
norms and expectations associated with the cultivated gentleman of 
the eighteenth century, who was the ultimate subject of taste. The 
beautiful and the sublime are, in their eighteenth-century versions, 
two complementary poles of the life of taste. We should speak of the 
life or activity of taste here because the beautiful and the sublime 
embody two necessary dimensions of the classical bourgeois concep- 
tion of the moral and social life. Such a political economy, Jacques 
Derrida has claimed, "is implicated in every discourse on art and on 
the beautiful."7 The outlines of this political economy are already 
evident in Burke, who correlates the idea of the beautiful with the 
passion of love and the sociable tendency, while connecting that of 
the sublime with the desire or instinct of self-preservation. The beau- 
tiful is appealing in itself, reminding us of the tender and social pas- 
sions which attract us to others; it is also the subject matter of aesthetic 
sociability, becoming the ground for that mutual pleasure in the beau- 
tiful which forms a large part of the life of taste. In the experience 
of the sublime, on the other hand, a virtual or imaginary threat 
throws us back upon our own resources; reminded of our vulnera- 
bility, we withdraw temporarily from communication, in a pattern of 
action which is analogous to that of preserving the self when we are 
endangered. Kant's treatment of the beautiful and sublime takes 
these same themes to be essential but grounds them in a priori fac- 
ulties of human nature rather than in the empirical experience of 
Burke and the English philosophical tradition. Kant continuously 
stresses that aesthetic judgments must be universally communicable, 
suggesting even at times that aesthetic pleasure is the consequence 
rather than the ground of such communicability, as in this crucial 
passage of the Critique of Judgment: "It is the universal capacity for 
being communicated incident to the mental state in the given rep- 
resentation which, as the subjective condition of the judgment of 
taste, must be fundamental, with the pleasure in the object as its 
consequent."8 
In a recent analysis of this topic, Paul Guyer has argued that the 
claim which would make communicability constitutive of the aesthetic 
judgment, rather than its sign and consequence, is a survival in Kant's 
later thought of his precritical aesthetics.9 Guyer reconstructs Kant's 
thought here by suggesting that in his mature aesthetic theory com- 
municability is not the origin of aesthetic pleasure but its goal. Yet 
even this interpretation of Kant's thought places his analysis of the 
beautiful within the framework of a political economy of taste. Kant's 
stress on the universal communicability of pleasure in the beautiful 
is an aspect of the ethical universalism and cosmopolitanism charac- 
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teristic of his thought. In contrast to the mainstream of English the- 
ories of taste which were then prevalent, Kant does not regard taste 
as the special possession of a social elite; English theories tended to 
regard taste as an aristocratic faculty, present in only a few and de- 
pendent, generally, upon both proper birth and education.10 While 
Kant agrees that taste is not actually universal, he insists both that it 
is potentially so and that this potentiality is presupposed in the aes- 
thetic judgment itself. Whereas the English based their account of 
taste on an empirical observation which suggested that only a small 
segment of society could indeed have the appropriate experiences 
and share them with others, Kant's belief that one can, a priori, sup- 
pose a common set of cognitive faculties in all men leads to a uni- 
versalistic theory of beauty and sublimity. From the standpoint of 
political economy both Burke and Kant are acknowledging the role 
of exchange, communication, and social intercourse in the life of 
taste; one limits such communication to the relatively closed com- 
munities revealed by actual observation, while the other attempts to 
disclose the universal principle underlying the communication. The 
other side of the communication and exchange through which civil 
society is constituted, however, is the possibility of withdrawing from 
it. Burke follows Hobbes in claiming that self-preservation will always 
be a valid reason and an effective cause of withdrawal. In Kant's 
analysis of the sublime, Burke's self-preservation is replaced by the 
awareness of our transcendent freedom and moral vocation, another 
move from the empirical to the a priori level. There is, then, a far- 
reaching analogy between the dual structure of communication and 
the possibility of withdrawal which constitute society, conceived on 
the model of eighteenth-century political economy, and the com- 
munication of our pleasure in the beautiful and the isolating aware- 
ness of the transcendent in our experience of the sublime. 
It has been argued by Georg Lukacs that the rise of aesthetics in 
eighteenth-century England and Germany is tied to the need of the 
middle class either to form an ideal which would fortify its precarious 
position (in England) or which would provide it with an alternative 
to revolution within a repressive, nonfeudal context (in Germany).11 
These are important considerations, although Lukacs's account seems 
skewed in a number of respects, such as in its failure to recognize a 
strongly aristocratic strain within English aesthetics. What I want to 
emphasize in this analysis, however, is not such global connections 
between aesthetic doctrines and social movements; rather, I want to 
suggest that we can learn something about the political ramifications 
of aesthetic thought by noting structural parallels between the cate- 
gories of aesthetic and social discourse. 
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Consider the language in which Kant somewhat tentatively de- 
scribes the ideal conversation which would be conducted by men of 
taste. When we call an object beautiful, Kant says, "we believe our- 
selves to be speaking with a universal voice, and lay claim to the 
concurrence of every one, whereas no private sensation would be 
decisive except for the observer alone and his liking. Here, now, we 
may perceive that nothing is postulated in the judgement of taste but 
such a universal voice in respect of delight that is not mediated by 
concepts.... The judgement of taste itself does not postulate the 
agreement of every one ... it only imputes this agreement to every 
one.... "12 Here Kant postulates something analogous to whatJiirgen 
Habermas has called an ideal speech community, in which there is a 
free and full discussion of the matter at hand and agreement that 
differences are to be settled by appeal to universally accepted prin- 
ciples and methods of inquiry. To make an aesthetic judgment is 
virtually to become a member of such a community, believing that 
one can rely on the universal voice of one's fellow speakers. Some- 
times Kant seems to have in mind such an ideal speech situation, even 
when he is apparently speaking of actual speech. Consider his claim 
that "as regards the agreeable every one concedes that his judgement, 
which he bases on a private feeling, and in which he declares that an 
object pleases him, is restricted merely to himself personally."13 Does 
everyone actually make such a concession? In fact Kant means that 
they would do so if the question were properly presented and ex- 
plained. But the further query arises as to how much must be built 
into the ground rules of such a situation in order to guarantee the 
desired result. Here Kant's discussion of some actual speech which 
touches on matters of taste is illuminating. The question of just what 
such a discursive situation would be like is complicated by the fact 
that, on Kant's analysis of taste, there can be no rules to which any 
of the speakers can appeal to validate their claims. Moreover, the 
question arises as to whether such a discussion would itself be strictly 
rational or if it could consist in part of aesthetic experiences. On the 
first alternative the model community of taste would seem to suffer 
even more intensely from the abstraction which many have objected 
to in John Rawls's analogous recasting of social contract theory. That 
is, just as Rawls supposes that we can arrive at the principles of justice 
by supposing what procedures would seem fair "behind the veil of 
ignorance" where we are ignorant of our own specific social situation 
and assets, so Kant (on this interpretation) would ask us to choose 
those principles of taste which would emerge in an aesthetic discus- 
sion in which none of us knew his or her actual pleasures, aesthetic 
or otherwise-that is, behind a veil of aesthetic ignorance. One model 
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for the second alternative is found in Kant's analysis of the ingredi- 
ents of good dinner-party conversation, which ought to include sto- 
ries (narrative) and wit as well as narrowly rational speech. It is worth 
noting that Habermas's ideal speech situation includes only the last 
of these.14 Despite the fact that Kant's guests testified to the cosmo- 
politan charm of his dinner parties, there are obvious limits to this 
possible model. It is a historically and culturally limited practice; even 
at its best the temporary community and good cheer tends to obscure 
real differences of power among the participants which are likely to 
influence the outcome of any discussion of matters of taste. 
Kant left the question of the relative significance of the beautiful 
and the sublime to his contemporaries and successors. Schiller is 
among the most important of these because he was forced to supple- 
ment his own aesthetics of the beautiful, as it was expressed in the 
Letters on Aesthetic Education, with a consideration of the sublime. Al- 
though beauty presents us with a harmony of reason and sense, 
"beauty alone could never teach us that our destination is to act as 
pure intelligence.... In the presence of the sublime, on the contrary, 
reason and the sensuous are not in harmony, and it is precisely this 
contradiction between the two which makes the charm of the sub- 
lime-its irresistible action on our minds."15 Schiller, however, criti- 
cized the Kantian limitation of the sublime to experiences of the nat- 
ural world, arguing that art was able to keep the monstrous and 
horrifying at a distance so that we might not be overpowered by our 
actual fear or by a practical exigency to which we must attend. Kant 
himself had said rather briefly and schematically that "even the pre- 
sentation of the sublime, so far as it belongs to fine art, may be 
brought into union with beauty in a tragedy in verse, a didactic poem or 
an oratorio, and in this combination fine art is even more artistic."16 
For Schiller tragedy was the clearest artistic presentation of the sub- 
lime; both theoretically and in the writing of his own tragedies, he 
added a historical dimension to the concept of the tragic sublime. 
Schiller speaks simultaneously as philosopher, historian, and tragic 
poet when he says: "Away then with that false theory which supposes 
falsely a harmony binding the doing of good with a happy life. Let 
evil destiny show its face. Our safety is not in blindness but in facing 
our dangers. What can do so better than familiarity with the splendid 
and terrible evolution of events, or than pictures showing man in 
conflict with chance; evil triumphant, security deceived-pictures 
shown us throughout history, and placed before us by tragedy?"17 
In a recent essay Hayden White has called for a return to Schiller's 
sense of the historical sublime as a necessary condition for a radical 
and imaginative vision of political and historical possibilities. The con- 
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nections between poetry and politics in German Romanticism do tes- 
tify to a considerable extent to the plausibility of White's suggestion. 
Enthusiasm for the French Revolution and Napoleon, such as one 
finds in Holderlin and the young Hegel, was spurred and enhanced 
by Schiller's tragic poetry and his sense of the sublimity of history. 
But it seems to me that White's insight into the fundamental choice 
for the historian between an aesthetic of the beautiful or of the sub- 
lime is marred by a misreading of the relations, or dialectic, between 
these two possibilities in the German intellectual tradition from Hegel 
to Marx and beyond. White sees that an exclusive aesthetics of the 
beautiful will tend to make the historian construe the past as orderly 
and complete, leading to the introduction of ordering principles such 
as evolution and organic unity. A reading of history along these lines 
will in turn tend to lead to a conservative politics, as White argues: 
Although Hegel took up the question of the sublime, both explicity in his 
Aesthetics and implicitly in the Philosophy of History, he subordinated it to the 
notion of the beautiful in the former and to the notion of the rational in the 
latter. It was this demotion of the sublime in favor of the beautiful that 
constituted the heritage from German idealism to both radical and conser- 
vative thought about the kind of utopian existence mankind could justifiably 
envisage as the ideal aim or goal of any putatively progressive historical pro- 
cess. ... It is the aesthetics of the beautiful which, as Thomas Weiskel sug- 
gests, undercuts the radical impulse of this tradition. This undercutting may 
account in part for the weak psychological appeal of "the beautiful life" as a 
project to be realized in political struggles and, more importantly, for the 
apparent incapacity of political regimes founded on Marxist principles to 
sustain their professed programs for the radical transformation of society in 
anything but the most banal ways.18 
I agree with White that the use made of the German aesthetic 
tradition in Marxist political regimes has tended, at best, to the banal; 
one could establish this not only by looking at the dreary work of 
socialist realism but even in the post-1930 writings of Georg Lukacs, 
who was the most representative and influential heir of German ide- 
alism within the world of those regimes. Yet I want to propose an- 
other sketch of the history and dialectic of the beautiful and sublime 
within that tradition and some of its heirs which will show that the 
tendencies represented by the Kantian-Schillerian sublime did not 
disappear with the emergence of the Hegelian system and so may be 
reappropriated more directly than White's account suggests. 
The most systematic and influential system of aesthetics to follow 
Kant's Critique is that contained in Hegel's Lectures on Aesthetics. Hegel 
held that reason not only aimed at comprehending the totality but 
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that, in grasping the dialectical nature of reality, it succeeded at this 
task. He defined the beautiful as the sensuous appearance or shining 
(Scheinen) of the Idea, thinking of art as approximating the concep- 
tual grasp of the whole which was completed in philosophy. Since 
Hegel thought of the understanding as a prosaic application of rules 
to examples, and also rejected the idea of an unknowable, he did not 
divide the philosophy of art along the Kantian dichotomy of the un- 
derstanding (beauty) and the reason (sublimity). There is only one 
realm of the artistic or aesthetic; it is governed by reason, and Hegel 
calls it the beautiful or the Ideal. But the terminology calls for a gloss. 
Schiller, as Dieter Henrich has pointed out, uses "the Ideal" to des- 
ignate the unity of the beautiful and the sublime, and Hegel acknowl- 
edges an important debt to Schiller's aesthetics; so we must be cau- 
tious in supposing that Hegel has simply thrown out the sublime.19 
Within the beautiful, however, Hegel discerns three basic modes of 
relation between the Idea and its sensuous manifestation, or between 
content and form. These correspond generally to phases in the his- 
torical development of art. In the first or symbolic mode, the Idea is 
conceived vaguely or abstractly and is imperfectly embodied; in the 
classical mode there is a harmonious interplay of sensuous form and 
conceptual content, exemplified by Greek sculpture; in the final or 
Romantic mode the Idea or conceptual content is too spiritual for 
any adequate embodiment in sensuous materials, including poetic 
images. For Hegel the sublime is a variety of the symbolic; typified 
by the Psalms of the Jewish Bible, it consists in a sense of the over- 
whelming contrast between the finite-man and the powers of the 
world-and the genuine infinity of God. The God of the sublime is 
not yet known or revealed as he will be in Greek or Christian art; he 
is thought of as a limiting concept, known only as that which stands 
in perpetual contrast with the finite. Hegel consistently suggests in a 
number of places that Kant's entire philosophy rests on a similar 
dualistic assumption. Hegel's apparent response to the Burkean and 
Kantian sublime, then, was to relegate it to a preliminary or primitive 
phase of art by giving it a historical nature. As we will soon see, 
however, the historicizing of the sublime can also be used in precisely 
the opposite direction in order to devalue the beautiful. 
From a deeper point of view, however, Hegel's conception of art 
is a synthesis of the concepts of beauty and sublimity. Art must have 
some immediate sensuous appeal (beauty), but it must also display 
the radical freedom of the human spirit (sublimity). Because the Idea 
can manifest itself to the senses, beauty and sublimity can be com- 
bined in the Ideal. The same pattern is repeated on a different level 
in Hegel's theory of the poetic genres. The epic world is one of self- 
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contained beauty; the lyric testifies to the sublime freedom of the 
poetic voice over its material; while the drama combines these aspects 
by showing a world composed of both freedom and order. Hegel's 
combination of the beautiful and the sublime in art conceived as a 
form of spiritual self-knowledge carries with it a social meaning. To 
understand art is to see the rationality of its history, and this is to 
become a member of that community which has come to see that 
philosophy (including aesthetics) is not simply the love of wisdom but 
the actual possession and practice of scientific knowledge. The mel- 
ancholy aspect of this transformation is Hegel's claim that "art, con- 
sidered in its highest vocation, is and remains a thing of the past" 
and that its transcendent status in beautiful eras like classical Greece 
and the late Middle Ages has been replaced by the science of art.20 
The Hegelian art historian is a man of knowledge, in contrast to the 
eighteenth-century man of taste. While Kant had implicitly criticized 
the aristocratic views of the English, according to which birth and 
breeding are prerequisites for the exercise of taste, he retained the 
gentlemanly disdain which those views have for anything which 
would introduce definite reasons and knowledge into the under- 
standing of beauty. Neither aristocratic status nor a presumed moral 
sensitivity are sufficient, on Hegel's view, to give us a proper under- 
standing of art. To have reached such an understanding, which is 
potentially available to all, is to have consciously taken one's place as 
a member of the Hegelian community of absolute knowledge-the 
group that Hegel designates with the word we. Membership in that 
group is potentially universal, and Hegel believed that this potential 
would become actualized as the modern world came increasingly to 
embody its distinctive principle that "all are free" (in contrast to the 
"one" or "some" who are free in the Oriental and Greco-Roman 
worlds). Hegelian knowledge, including the knowledge of the 
meaning of art and its history, is itself one of the important means 
of human liberation. Whereas the potential universality of the com- 
munity of taste in which Kant believes still rests upon our inability 
to give definitive grounds for our aesthetic judgments, the Hegelian 
finds that such universality is achieved by a scientific understanding 
of the actual history of art, which exhibits at the same time our spir- 
itual and political history. The model is no longer the appeal by the 
connoisseur to an ineffable je ne sais quoi but the orderly exposition 
of the art historian to his class (of which Hegel's lectures give us 
perhaps the first example). 
Hegel connects this quest for intelligibility with his account of sub- 
limity in his discussion of tragedy and comedy. Although Hegel has 
often been called a pan-tragic thinker and much has been said about 
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Hegel's "theory of tragedy," it is significant that the two systematic 
discussions of the poetic genres in his works end with an analysis of 
comedy which suggests that it is the more comprehensive of the two 
forms. Moreover, Hegel seems to agree with Schiller, in opposition 
to Kant, that comedy is also the more sublime of the two forms. In 
his essay "On Naive and Sentimental Poetry" Schiller had argued that 
this difference has to do with tragedy's reliance on established legends 
or history for its subject matter and comedy's need for invention: 
The tragic poet is supported by his theme, the comic poet on the other hand 
must rise to his aesthetic height through his own person. The first may make 
a leap for which, however, not much is required; the other must remain 
himself, he must therefore already be there and be at home there where the 
first cannot attain without a startling leap. And it is precisely in this way that 
the beautiful character is distinguished from the sublime. In the first, all the 
dimensions are already contained, flowing unconstrainedly and effortlessly 
by its nature and it is, according to its capacity, an infinitude at every point 
in its path; the other can elevate and exert itself to any dimension, by the 
power of its will it can tear itself out of any state of limitation. The latter is, 
then, only intermittently and with effort free, the former with facility and 
always.21 
This could perhaps be summarized by saying that although the 
content of tragedy is more sublime than that of comedy, comedy's 
form is more sublime insofar as it requires and exhibits a greater 
aesthetic freedom on the part of the poet. Hegel develops the point 
in his discussion of Greek Kunstreligion in the Phenomenology. That 
discussion should be read in the light of the "tyranny of Greece over 
Germany" which is obvious in Schiller, Hegel, Goethe, and many 
other writers of the time. In analyzing the recognized paradigm of 
artistic development by means of his own dialectical principles, Hegel 
is making a statement about the resources of art in general. The 
intelligibility of the Greek and Romantic project of a religion of art 
depends, Hegel claims, on recognizing that it tends toward the spir- 
itual elevation of comedy, in which the audience of the work of art 
discover their own freedom by finding a virtual identity with the 
intense freedom of the comic poet. In contrast, Hegel describes 
tragedy as a mode in which that freedom is relatively obscured: in its 
plot by the domination of fate; in characterization by the actors' as- 
sumption of the masks or disguises of legendary heroes presumed to 
be greatly superior to the men of today; and in the radical of pre- 
sentation by the somewhat mysterious role of the poet himself, who 
stands somewhere behind or outside his production. In the spirit of 
Schiller, then, Hegel can declare unreservedly that Antigone is the 
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most beautiful of all works of art, either ancient or modern; but he 
also speaks of the unparalleled spiritual elevation, or sublime char- 
acter, of Aristophanic and Shakespearean comedy. 
The sublime freedom of comedy consists in the realization that we 
have the same freedom to shape our social and political lives which 
the comic poet has as a creator. Hegel's description of the comic state 
of mind is quite similiar to Kant's account of the return to the true 
self which is provoked by the sublime in nature: "What this self- 
consciousness beholds is that whatever assumes the form of essen- 
tiality over against it, is instead dissolved in it-in its thinking, its 
existence, and its action-and is at its mercy. It is the return of ev- 
erything universal into the certainty of itself which, in consequence, 
is this complete loss of fear and of essential being on the part of all 
that is alien."22 
There is a fairly direct line which leads from Hegel's apotheosis of 
comedy to Marx's poetics. The line is complicated by the fact that two 
philosophers of the Hegelian school, at least one of whom Marx 
studied carefully, devoted great efforts to clarifying the relations of 
the beautiful, the sublime, and the comic. F. T. Vischer and Karl 
Rosenkranz both argued in effect, as does Hayden White, that Hegel 
had unduly restricted the sphere of the aesthetic by limiting it to the 
beautiful. Vischer's early work On the Sublime and the Comic set the 
pattern for his later massive and encyclopedic Aesthetik, which was 
one of the most influential works of German aesthetics in the second 
half of the century. Vischer's argument was that Hegel had unduly 
restricted the artistic and aesthetic by considering them only in terms 
of the beautiful. He implicitly claimed to out-Hegel Hegel by finding 
the beautiful to be only the first or immediate moment of the aes- 
thetic. The second is the sublime, understood as the negation of the 
beautiful and susceptible of fine discriminations into various forms. 
The final, reconciling moment is the comic, conceived as combining 
the immediate appeal of the beautiful with the disparity and conflict 
typical of the sublime. Rosenkranz's Aesthetics of the Ugly employs a 
similar structure, although he thinks of the ugly as the more inclusive 
negative aesthetic concept.23 
Marx's own aesthetics is expressed in the form of a number of 
comments scattered about in his discussions of many subjects. This 
makes it difficult to assess in its entirety, and the problem is compli- 
cated by the fact that so many writers have claimed to speak in Marx's 
name. Yet while Marx does say, in the 1844 Manuscripts, that "man 
also creates according to the laws of beauty," we ought not to suppose 
on these grounds that he adhered to a one-sided aesthetics of the 
beautiful. Rather than making one more attempt to synthesize Marx's 
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many fragments on art and the aesthetic, it is possible, in the spirit 
of Hayden White's analysis in Metahistory, to investigate the poetics 
implicit in Marx's own writings. When we do so we see that the comic 
mode plays a role analogous to that which it is given in the theories 
of Schiller, Hegel, and some of Hegel's students. Marx begins one of 
his most extended historical narratives of his own times, The Eighteenth 
Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, with an allusion to Hegel, tragedy, and 
comedy: "Hegel remarks somewhere that all facts and personages of 
great importance occur, as it were, twice. He forgot to add, the first 
time as tragedy, the second as farce."24 The dominant images of the 
Eighteenth Brumaire are drawn from the comic theater, the farce, and 
the carnival. This parodic theme is pervasive in Marx's writings, 
arising from his early adoption of the Hegelian view that "the final 
phase of a world-historical form is its comedy."25 To see history as a 
comedy is, as Marx says in the second paragraph of the Eighteenth 
Brumaire, to realize that "men make their own history, but they do 
not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circum- 
stances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly en- 
countered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all 
the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the 
living."26 
Comic self-awareness is connected, as in Schiller, with the sense of 
previous history as a powerful and irrational force. The comic con- 
sciousness that we do make our own history within such limitations 
is a more precise and articulate version of Schiller's comic sublime. 
Marx, then, does not adopt an uncritical aesthetics of the beautiful 
but announces that "the social revolution of the nineteenth century 
cannot draw its poetry from the past, but only from the future."27 
That is, it is only through the purgation of the comic sublime that 
men can proceed to the point of genuine historical action. As early 
as 1843, in his Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, after explaining 
his view that each world-historical epoch ends in comedy, Marx asks: 
"Why should history proceed in this way? So that mankind shall sep- 
arate itself gladly from its past."28 The comic sublime, like Schiller's 
contemplation of the tragedy of history, requires a radical break with 
the presumed continuity of purpose which conservatives evoke in 
their defense of established politics. The ideal of universal commun- 
icability is abandoned as the differences between conservative and 
radical views of the same historical events are emphasized. Louis Na- 
poleon is not a heroic agent but a farcical clown, and his attempt to 
wear the heroic costume of his uncle is a travesty of the way in which 
the French Revolution of 1789 took on the trappings of Roman re- 
publican virtue. Of the many thinkers who have attempted to develop 
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a Marxist poetics, it is Mikhail Bakhtin who is closest to Marx's vision 
of the comic sublime. Bakhtin's attempt in his book on Rabelais is 
precisely to show how the conventional aesthetics of beauty has 
blinded most literary critics to the liberating possibilities of the car- 
nivalesque.29 As Bakhtin understands it, the carnival enacts just the 
sort of reversal which Marx narrates in the Eighteenth Brumaire. Marx 
in fact enlarged on the genre in Herr Vogt, a long sequel to the Eigh- 
teenth Brumaire, in which Rabelaisian techniques and allusions are em- 
ployed in order to deflate the lies and pretensions of a German pro- 
pagandist for Louis Napoleon.30 
Marx's original plan was to call this work Da-Da Vogt, Da-Da being 
the Algerian translator of Louis Napoleon, in order to suggest that 
Vogt was a mere ventriloquist's dummy. But Marx, like the Dadaists 
of the twentieth century, may also have been attracted by the childish 
and nonsensical sound of the phrase, since he wanted to suggest, as 
they did, that there was something senseless and chaotic in established 
or official reality. Marx reluctantly gave in to the more sober Engels, 
who had urged him to give his book a more intelligible title, but not 
until he had said that "the fact that Da-Da will puzzle the philistine 
pleases me and fits well into my system of mockery and contempt."31 
I am suggesting that Marx is to be taken seriously when he speaks of 
a system of mockery and contempt and that we can find the theoretical 
origins of that system in the aesthetics of the sublime and its literary 
exemplars in Rabelais, Shakespeare's Falstaff, and the other carni- 
valesque figures which people Herr Vogt. 
Marx's extensive notes on the aesthetics of F. T. Vischer, made just 
a year or two before the composition of Herr Vogt, show him taking 
an explicit interest in Vischer's account of the sublime. Vischer's dis- 
cussion of the measureless seems to have helped Marx to formulate 
the economic categories of Capital and other later writings. Capital 
has a tendency toward a continuous and monstrous development in 
which every boundary of measure is left behind. Like the Kantian 
mathematical sublime, capital can expand indefinitely as an objective 
and threatening presence. But the true or deeper movement of the 
sublime is provided by the demonstration, carried out at the begin- 
ning of Capital, that money and the fetishism of commodities are 
human constructions which can be modified or displaced by other 
human acts. 
Marxist aesthetics after Marx can hardly be considered as an in- 
tegral theory; White's suggestion that Marxism is committed to an 
aesthetics of the beautiful is true only of one tendency within the 
many schools of Marxist aesthetics. Lukacs is doubtless the most in- 
teresting and significant thinker who fits White's description. Al- 
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though Lukacs's earlier writings were exemplary explorations of 
tragic and existential themes, his mature aesthetics of the 1930s and 
later is oriented toward a classical conception of beauty. As Fredric 
Jameson has shown, that concern expresses itself through a concen- 
tration on narrative forms which is governed by Hegel's analysis of 
the epic as presenting an integrated world. The epic world is struc- 
tured by "natural" relations between man and nature, man and other 
men, and man and his products; it may include tragic conflict, but 
as "an answer without a question" it has no room for the forms of 
alienation which Marx and Lukacs thought of as characterizing 
modern life.32 Lukacs's later discussions of European realism of the 
nineteenth century are explorations of the deformation of the epic 
ideal under capitalism and of the promise of its revival. For Lukacs 
it was important both to envision the entire literary tradition as 
moving toward or falling away from this goal and to construct a 
history of aesthetics in which Hegel and Marx emerge as theorists of 
the beautiful rather than the sublime. Especially revealing is Lukacs's 
long essay on Marx's notes on Vischer. While noting that Vischer 
appealed to Marx because he made an attempt to comprehend the 
realistic art of the nineteenth century, Lukacs fails to observe that 
Marx also developed and was stimulated by Vischer's attempt to re- 
store the element of the sublime.33 Similarly, insofar as he invokes 
the authority of Hegel, Lukacs construes his aesthetics in terms of 
the opposition between ancient and modern narrative rather than 
recognizing the development toward comic freedom which Hegel al- 
ways sees as the dissolution (Aufl6sung) or elimination of art. Through 
this systematic repression of Hegelian comedy and Marxist Dadaism, 
Lukacs denies himself the theoretical and critical concepts which 
would have allowed him to see the liberating power of modernism. 
Walter Benjamin and T. W. Adorno attempted to keep faith with 
the spirit of early Lukacs while often engaged in conflict with the 
beautified Hegelianism of later Lukacs. This leads to an emphasis on 
the sublime in their work which has often led their critics to regard 
them as tragic and pessimistic thinkers. To put the matter briefly in 
a formula which will soon be unpacked, we can say that Benjamin's 
fundamental tendency is to think the sublime, although he occasion- 
ally makes a desperate grasp for the beautiful, while Adorno sees the 
beautiful as of the first importance for the arts but that he is obses- 
sively conscious of our distance from that beauty and that the artic- 
ulation of that distance makes him into a practical critic of the sub- 
lime. This formula is meant to aid in understanding how it is, as a 
recent commentator on the Frankfurt school has said, that "the work 
of each is the only corrective for that of the other," and that they are 
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(to use Adorno's language now) "torn halves of an integral freedom, 
to which however they do not add up."34 
Benjamin's early book on the seventeenth-century Trauerspiel is no- 
table for its renewal of the critical concept of allegory. To see Trauer- 
spiel as allegory is to recognize a significant artistic mode which does 
not aim at a harmony in the realm of beautiful appearance but which 
is structured by the discontinuity of allegorical vehicle and its ultimate 
referent. This sense of gaps, discontinuities, and tensions is perhaps 
the most impressive single aspect of Benjamin's criticism. It is stated 
quite clearly in his analysis of translation. As a translator of Baude- 
laire and Proust, Benjamin came to see that he, and all translators, 
were faced with the fundamental choice between creating a self-suf- 
ficient poem or text in their own language or of letting the strange- 
ness, specificity, and haecceity of the work to be translated shine 
through the words of one's own language, even if the latter could 
not be an integral work of art. The goal of this juxtaposition is the 
pursuit of what Benjamin calls a "pure language." In translation, he 
says, "the great motif of integrating many tongues into one true lan- 
guage is at work.... If there is such a thing as a language of truth, 
the tensionless and even silent depository of the ultimate truth which 
all thought strives for, then this language of truth is-the true lan- 
guage. And this very language, whose divination and description is 
the only perfection a philosopher can hope for, is concealed in con- 
centrated fashion in translations."35 For Benjamin, then, it is impor- 
tant that a translation not produce the illusion of beauty but that it 
serve as a means of provoking the awareness of an infinite and prob- 
ably impossible task (note the hypothetical "if there is a language of 
truth ... "). In other words, translation must, by the shock arising 
from the confrontation of two incongruous languages, produce an 
awareness of that unattainable linguistic totality which lies beyond all 
finite languages. 
The pattern exhibited in Benjamin's thought of the linguistic sub- 
lime is paradigmatic for his general approach to art and history. Per- 
haps all of these aspects of his work can be traced to a kind of gnostic 
thinking according to which history is a panorama of the fallen and 
degraded which is occasionally illuminated by traces of a fuller and 
more human life. It then becomes the task of the critic, as of the 
translator, to awaken these traces in order to provoke some con- 
sciousness of that which lies beyond them and to which they testify. 
In the "Theses on the Philosophy of History" we read that "[t]he past 
carries with it a temporal index by which it is referred to redemption. 
There is a secret agreement between past generations and the present 
one. Our coming was expected on earth. Like every generation that 
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preceded us, we have been endowed with a weak Messianic power, a 
power to which the past has a claim. That claim cannot be settled 
cheaply. Historical materialists are aware of that."36 
The historical sublime in Benjamin represents something of a re- 
turn from Hegel to Schiller. "The historical materialist must abandon 
the epic element in history ... [he] explodes the epoch out of its 
reified 'historical continuity,' and thereby lifts life out of this epoch, 
and the work out of the life work."37 Materialism is a break with the 
contemplative idealism which tends to see history as rounded and 
complete, as in Hegel's view of the classical epic. 
Adorno's conceptions of beauty and sublimity can be found in his 
reading of the Odyssey. Schiller, in his essay "On the Sublime," had 
already presented the story as a conflict of the beautiful and the 
sublime: "The beauty displayed by the figure of the goddess Calypso 
enchanted the brave son of Ulysses, and by the power of her charms 
she long held him captive on her island. For a long time he believed 
he was worshipping an immortal divinity, yet he lay only in the arms 
of lust-but suddenly a sublime impression overcame him in the 
guise of Mentor: he recollected his higher mission, cast himself into 
the waves, and was free."38 Making allowances for the fact that 
Schiller is following Fenelon's Adventures of Telemachus rather than the 
Homeric Odyssey, it is worth noting that Adorno's interpretation of 
the story expresses precisely the opposite evaluation. While Schiller 
(in a Kantian spirit) praises the sublime state of mind which allows 
the man enthralled by Calypso to take his leave, Adorno reads the 
story as an allegory of the unhappy sacrifice of beauty that must be 
performed by the man of reason and duty. The beauty of the myth- 
ical world which Odysseus leaves behind is not only the promise of 
happiness but its seal and confirmation. The sublime character who 
abandons happiness and beauty is, on his view, the first example of 
the prudent, patriarchal, and enlightened character who values ra- 
tional calculation and the domination of nature more highly than he 
does instinctual satisfaction. Adorno's reading is also markedly dif- 
ferent from the Hegelian view of the epic world (adopted also by 
Lukacs) as exhibiting a fundamental unity of man and nature, passion 
and spirit. While Schiller was able to protect his view of Homer's 
naivete by considering the later "sentimental" version of the story by 
Fenelon, Adorno sees the hero as "a prototype of the bourgeois in- 
dividual." He reads back into Homer those characteristics of the iso- 
lated hero which Hegel and Lukacs saw as features of post-epic nar- 
rative: "Odysseus, too, is the self who always restrains himself and 
forgets his life, who saves his life and yet recalls it only as wan- 
dering."39 The encounter with the Sirens is paradigmatic: through 
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his cunning Odysseus is able to hear their beautiful song, but this 
requires not only his domination of his crew, but also, since he is 
bound, the sacrifice of a natural connection between music and erotic 
activity. 
Most of Adorno's discussions of the arts have to do with the modern 
era, in which taste is no longer a viable concept. Authentic art is 
possible now only in the mode of the sublime, testifying to the radical 
degradation of the world and to the loss of a real community of artist 
and audience. Adorno agrees with Benjamin that in a world of frag- 
mentation and destruction art can indirectly point the way to some- 
thing quite different only through the integrity of its form and its 
refusal to compromise with prevailing ideology. Yet the essay on 
Odysseus reveals a genuine nostalgia for the beautiful which has a 
quite different orientation than Benjamin's messianic expectations. 
Adorno must, like Odysseus, exact a heavy price from himself in 
order to enjoy such nostalgic happiness and beauty even in vicarious 
fashion; he condemns himself to the labor of the negative, that is, of 
delineating the many forms of the grotesque and terrible sublime 
presented by culture after Auschwitz. Even the Homeric Greeks are 
no longer the normal and happy children which they still were for 
Marx. 
Other variations on the priority of the beautiful or sublime appear 
in the various thinkers of the Frankfurt school. Herbert Marcuse's 
fundamental debt to Schiller, specifically to the Schiller of the Letters 
on Aesthetic Education, is apparent in his many attempts to show that 
beauty is the promise of happiness. The younger thinkers of the 
school, such as Habermas and Apel, have differentiated themselves 
from their elders by a systematic repression of the aesthetic for the 
sake of articulating the constitutive features of rational community 
and discourse. Lacking an aesthetics of their own, their vision of social 
change has neither the tragic nor comic dimensions so prominent in 
Marx's rhetoric. The projected growth of rational community in their 
works, then, takes on much of the flavor of liberal theories of the 
late nineteenth century, which also tended to lack poetic vision. A 
significant irony is to be found in Karl-Otto Apel's attempt to remedy 
the lack of an aesthetics in his version of critical theory through an 
enthusiasm for the philosophy of Charles Peirce.40 While it is true 
that Peirce has a hierarchical concept of the normative sciences in 
which logic depends on ethics and ethics on aesthetics, Peirce's aes- 
thetics is itself a very generalized and diluted version of Schiller's 
conception of beauty which again, like Marcuse's adaptation, tends 
to omit the dimension of the sublime. How much richer are the re- 
sources of the German tradition of philosophical aesthetics which 
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Apel might have adapted more directly rather than through Peirce's 
interesting but attenuated reconstruction. 
It was the task of the eighteenth century to articulate the duality 
of the beautiful and the sublime as a way of comprehending the 
alternatives of the aesthetic life, and of the nineteenth and early twen- 
tieth centuries to develop the consequences of taking one or the other 
of these alternatives to have a special priority. Throughout such dis- 
cussions there is generally some significant affinity with the social and 
the political, which has been eclipsed in much of the aesthetic thought 
and literary theory of the twentieth century. An emphasis on formal 
structure, for example, although perhaps ultimately deriving from a 
Kantian conception of the beautiful, will tend to ignore Kant's own 
emphasis on universal communicability (and therefore universal com- 
munity) as the goal of the contemplation of form. Kant's early Obser- 
vations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and Sublime is a very revealing 
work in this context. Although slight in strictly conceptual content, 
the essay shows a refreshing tendency to take aesthetic categories as 
simultaneously moral and social. Thus it is not only literary works 
and landscapes, but also passions, individual and national characters, 
the division of the sexes, and virtuous dispositions of different sorts 
which are classified as beautiful or sublime. The lesson to be learned 
is neither that we adopt Kant's quaint if suggestive classifications 
(Italy is beautiful, England is sublime) nor that we learn to do the 
same thing more accurately. Rather, we might use such an approach 
as the antidote to those currents in contemporary aesthetic theory 
and practice which deliberately seek to repress the moral and political 
aspects of the artistic. No doubt there is a lesson to be learned from 
the fact that the tradition of the beautiful and the sublime has sur- 
vived most obviously in some of the branches of Marxist aesthetics 
and criticism. We might also note (contrary to White's thesis again) 
that the Marxist tradition, like the eighteenth century, has kept alive 
the idea that the very tension between the beautiful and the sublime 
is fruitful and need not be reduced to an absolute priority of one or 
the other. 
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